abstract: This article aims to develop a Marxist account to explain the more informal practices of imperialism today. In this respect the article agrees with those Marxists who argue that capitalists and politicians have sought to impose the hegemonic economic project of financial neoliberalism across the globe. However, unlike some Marxist accounts which tend to explore imperialism primarily through socioeconomic relations, this article argues that financial neoliberal hegemony is achieved through social, political and ideological mechanisms as well. This is to see and understand capitalism as a complex, interconnected whole in which the way that capital accrues profits is through the exploitation, governance and regulation of living labour, which itself requires social, political and ideological mechanisms in place to do so. The article argues that in contemporary imperialism these 'non-economic' forms of regulation have often been embedded in seemingly non-imperialist and more informal types of governance that some have identified as 'Empire'. The article suggests that these governance mechanisms have extended imperialist financial domination of the US state through the political projects of neoliberalism and workfarism.
Introduction
Some Marxists argue that contemporary global capitalism has developed along the lines set out by classical Marxists such as Lenin. In this theory world capitalism represents the ongoing merger of two distinct processes: the internationalization of production, circulation and investment and the coming together of private capital and the nation-state. 'In consequence, an increasingly integrated world economy becomes the arena for competition among capitals that tends now to take the form of geopolitical CS conflict among states' (Callinicos, 2005: 1) . Other Marxist writers such as Panitch and Gindin argue that the sort of imperialism outlined by classical Marxism has at least since the 1970s been surpassed by a global economic system in which the American state has created a set of financial governance mechanisms that has benefited other advanced capitalist nations. For example, advanced capitalist nations have been willing to engage in financial investment in the US economy on the assumption that they will benefit in some way from America's continued economic dominance in the world (Panitch and Gindin, 2003) .
Coming from a post-Marxist perspective, Hardt and Negri suggest that old-style imperialism has been surpassed by a more informal and anonymous imperial project. According to Negri (2000, 2004) , what has replaced imperialism is a hybrid global formation constituted through interrelated global networks of communication (e.g. the internet) and informal global networks of power (e.g. voluntary agencies and nongovernmental organizations working in the developing world have been coopted into a neoliberal agenda). However, global imperial power is also being challenged by a 'multitude' of global protest groups such as the anti-globalization movement, who use various forms of communication, information and knowledge to build networks of global resistance in and against forces of domination (see also the next section).
Coming from a critical non-Marxist viewpoint, Chandler (2007) argues that western elites have constructed global ethical agendas such as humanitarian intervention because they are unable to conceive of and act on any coherently defined interests they might have. He argues that the global formation known as Empire expresses the political weakness of western elites who exercise power in the world but lack the political capacity to construct a coherent leadership based on clear political principles that resonate with the lived experiences of specific populations. Programmes like ethical humanitarianism (e.g. respecting the 'rights' of the Other in 'failed states') do not have 'a sense of purpose or political meaning' and are not grounded in any real political context or 'future-orientated vision of society, to which a government is committed' (Chandler, 2007: 719) .
This article draws upon all of these viewpoints to develop a Marxist account to explain the informal practices of what is known as 'Empire' within the context of imperialist domination by the US state. The article agrees that capitalism has sought to impose the hegemonic economic project of financialization through neoliberalism across the globe but argues that financial neoliberal hegemony is achieved through social, political and ideological governance as well as economic means. Compare Marx on economic exploitation in Capital Vol. 3:
. . . the specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labour is pumped out of direct producers, determines the relationship of rulers to ruled, as it grows out of production itself and, in turn, reacts upon it as a determining element. Upon this, however, is founded the entire formation of the economic community which grows out of the production relations themselves, thereby simultaneously its specific political form. (Marx, 1977: 791; see also Dunn, 2009; Resnick and Wolff, 1987; Sakellaropoulos, 2007) In contemporary imperialism these 'non-economic' forms of regulation have often been embedded in seemingly non-imperialist and more informal types of governance that post-Marxists such as Hardt and Negri have identified as 'Empire'.
Financial neoliberalism requires governance mechanisms that circulate commodities and capital without the constraints of postwar interventionist welfare state policies. This has involved a process of 'offloading' welfare responsibilities to organizations such as business interests, charities, quasi-public institutions, regional authorities, global institutions and so on, a process ideologically justified as a means of 'including' and 'empowering' individuals in communities who can effectively target and meet local needs through devolved and informal 'partnership' networks. National, regional and global governance mechanisms have been introduced in civil society that further neoliberalism through institutional arrangements which, in turn, legitimize the economic project of financialization (Ayers, 2008) . The mechanisms of this new 'empowering' agenda have also flowed into their borders of developing countries as a way of extending the global reach of financial neoliberalism.
This approach is more nuanced than the framework proposed by postand non-Marxists such as Hardt and Negri and Chandler because it places the appearance of informality and political weakness of elites within the reality of how capital progresses through more 'immaterial' financial forms (Marx, 1977: 438-41) . A neoliberal workfare state project based on informal governance mechanisms has been increasingly embedded around the world. While nation-states have 'offloaded' some of their welfare responsibilities to other governance mechanisms this does not mean they have lost their power to regulate the flow of capital. In fact, nation-states remain the crucial regulatory mechanisms in governing capitalism, and the US state has been at the forefront in promoting those informal neoliberal governance mechanisms worldwide through the extension of financialization across the world; a specific type of hegemony that provides a rationale for establishing neoliberalism through informal governance (see also Barrow, 2005; Fine, 2001 ). Hardt and Negri's approach to the imperial, as opposed to imperialist, project of global capital provides the starting point for presenting a Marxist alternative to their arguments on this matter.
Financial Imperialism and the State of Empire
Hardt and Negri characterize the new global order as being both 'decentred' and 'totalizing': . . . we think it is important to note that what used to be conflict or competition among several imperialist powers has in important respects been replaced by the idea of a single power that overdetermines them all, structures them in a unitary way, and treats them under one notion of right that is decidedly postcolonial and postimperialist. (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 9) The analogy to a 'machine' employed by Hardt and Negri (2000: 14) helps us to understand this somewhat contradictory description of 'Empire'. Just as a machine is a self-contained entity that executes its tasks and procedures within its own authoritative rationale, so Empire produces an 'imperial constitutionalization of world order' operating upon a preordained global ethical foundation of right. The old imperialist project was based on one, or a few, powerful nation-states asserting their sovereign power over the political territory of less powerful countries (British imperialism being the obvious example here). In contrast, the current imperial project, which is more immaterial and intangible, penetrates the internal constitutions of other countries through a negotiated and contractual process made up of formal and informal 'networks of agreements and associations' (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 182) . Imperial power thus seems to be a force for global right and peace. The functions of nation-states have been displaced 'to other levels and domains' (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 307) , for example, global organizations like the G8, Davos and so on, while 'popular interests in the global power arrangement' (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 311) are represented in such non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as the United Nations, the global media, global social movements and so on.
Despite some elements of truth, for example the prominence of a new humanitarian ideology of global right (on which see the following sections), Hardt and Negri's argument is based on the questionable claim that the new imperial order represents a qualitative break from previous capitalist formations rather than the continuation, albeit in a new ideological form, of the contradictory development of capitalist accumulation through its financial and imperialist forms. This underlying rationale is questionable for three reasons. First, it endorses, at least in part, a Weberian ideal-type theory of the nation-state as a bureaucratic entity made up of a set of hierarchical rules based on means-ends calculations and holding a monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a defined territory (Weber, 1991; cf. Hardt and Negri, 2000: 339-40) . This allows Hardt and Negri to suggest that a qualitative shift has taken place in how the nation-state functions today, such that it must now be theorized as a multifunctional and non-strategic set of singular logics dependent upon the various imperial networks in which the nation-state becomes enmeshed (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 340-3) .
However, the capitalist state has never been fixated only on governing its own national territorial borders but has always sought to intervene in global patterns of accumulation (Wood, 2003) . The capitalist state aims to regulate the contradictions, dilemmas and problems within civil society through a structural and strategic ensemble of alliances and powers directed by a hegemonic political project (see Poulantzas, 2000 ; see also the next section for specific examples). This implies that the capitalist state must remain relatively autonomous of specific economic interests and aim instead to regulate capitalism as a whole.
The second related reason then to question the underlying rationale of Hardt and Negri's argument is that the capitalist state has always been an ensemble of structural and strategic relations directed by a hegemonic political project. Similarly, capitalist accumulation has always occurred through hegemonic economic projects that require institutional governance to ensure that the reproduction of capitalist circuits take place (Jessop, 2002) . In our contemporary times capitalist accumulation has occurred through financialization, i.e. 'the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies' (Epstein, 2006: 3; see also Krippner, 2005; Magdoff and Sweezy, 1987) .
Financialization requires institutional financial mechanisms embedded in civil society to ensure its reproduction and hegemony. Capital market intermediaries have institutional capacity enabling them to extend the hegemonic capacity of financialization across global civil society. In their study of the UK, Folkman et al. (2007) divide these intermediaries into two main groups. First, responsive functionaries such as audit partners, consultants, corporate lawyers and stock market analysts deal with the juridical requirements of market capitalism along with their stream funds into secondary markets of shares and bonds. Second, 'proactive initiators of deals, corporate restructuring and investment arbitrage opportunities' are associated with hyper-innovation in capital markets and non-routine demands from corporate customers. Included in this category are hedge fund managers, traders and dealers (Folkman et al., 2007: 557) . Financialization has also been promoted through global governance organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Wade (2007) argues that the IMF has consistently rejected an interventionist welfare agenda to regulate the new global financial architecture. Instead it favours 'softer' approaches to regulatory financial reform as witnessed by their Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs), whose aim is merely to collect information about a country's adherence to various global financial standards rather than to establish clear guidelines for states to intervene in and regulate their economies for welfare needs.
Financialization has encouraged a sense of immateriality to spread within advanced capitalist countries. Mortgages and credit cards were until the current financial downturn a case in point. House price inflation encouraged people to take on more debt, particularly in the US and UK. But when home owners felt confident with rising equity they were more prepared to engage in mortgage equity withdrawal such as remortgaging their homes. As a result, fixed assets 'dematerialized' (Smith and Searle, 2008) and securitization of credit in these markets meant that banks bundled credit card receivables together into a pool of loans. A trust known as a special purchase vehicle administered this pool of loans. Investors then purchased certificates in this trust and banks could take receivables off their balance sheets and earn a profit on the loans. Profits increased and more credit was handed out to people (Montgomerie, 2006: 313) . In both markets, then, a sense of 'immateriality' has flowed into each respective civil society along with a sense that all could satisfy, practise and freely create lifestyle consumption 'project identities' on an equal basis through credit and debt (Mooers, 2001) . The current problems of financial capital do not necessarily represent an absolute crisis for these 'immaterial' financial institutions and networks but could signal the empowerment of financial intermediaries through government bailouts (Konings and Panitch, 2008: 24-5) .
But financialization has also extended US economic imperialism across the globe, and this is the third reason why we need to question Hardt and Negri's arguments and their claim that no one state remains dominant in the world. Despite the recent financial crisis, the US dollar is still the main currency in the world, partly because the Federal Reserve has not held back in pumping liquidity into the global marketplace when an economic crisis has been on the horizon (Panitch and Gindin, 2003) . In addition, other economies have been willing to invest in the US. Much outsourcing by US multinationals has gone to Japan, which provides high valueadded components and finished products to the American industrial and military complex. Subsequently, 'it has been the Japanese elite that has acted to support the dollar . . . and, by extension, the continuation of American hegemony' (Murphy, 2006: 48-9) . High-priced US stocks have likewise been bought by foreign speculators that have helped to finance the American account deficit (Bello, 2005: 103) . Although America relies on other economies to maintain global economic hegemony it also provides the main coordinating economic axis for other world economies (Bromley, 2003: 65; see also Glyn, 2005; Green, 2002; Stokes, 2005) .
Hardt and Negri have mistaken the appearance of the informality and immateriality of global finance for the idea that we live in a decentred Empire. They wrongly claim that contemporary global capitalism is no longer mediated through an imperialist state formation, with the US state leading this imperialist formation. The next section develops these critical points by mapping out neoliberalism, the specific hegemonic project of the nation-state today, and to show how this political project is linked to financialization.
Finance and the Neoliberal Workfare Form of the State
Harvey (2006) defines neoliberalism as the 'maximisation of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterised by private property rights, individual liberty, free markets and free trade' (Harvey, 2006: 145) . There is a close relationship between financialization and the neoliberalism since the move towards neoliberalism requires finance (Crotty, 2000: 364) . Neoliberal policies encourage global competition, investment in the service sector and high-tech industries, and more generally increase the capacity of financial institutions and organizations to pursue their own market-based profit activities (Kotz, 2008) . The neoliberal project extends US financialization globally 'by drawing in a variety of heterogeneous and geographically dispersed practices and relations and concentrating them into a space structured by American rules and institutions' (Konings and Panitch, 2008: 21) . Harvey rightly suggests that the neoliberal project requires a political institutional project to push forward its agenda. Since the 1980s this dominant hegemonic political project has been focused on changing the welfare state towards a workfare form amenable to the shifting needs of neoliberalism (see Jessop, 2002) . The workfare state is keen to enact policies that favour neoliberal principles, promoting innovation in open global economies, supply-side policies and the subordination of social policy to the needs of labour market flexibility and/or the constraints of international competition. The workfare state is also highly dependent on capital investment for policy success so a number of nation-states have given corporations tax breaks, reduced labour and wage costs and minimized regulations for the business community (Farnsworth, 2006: 80) . Thus the wage is no longer viewed primarily as a source of demand as it was under mass production and the welfare state but is instead looked upon as a cost (Jessop, 2002: 105) . In the UK, for example, a workfare state aims to cut poverty through employment opportunities and the avoidance of a low-wage economy by policies such as the minimum wage. Those who cannot find work are given new training prospects. But the British workfare state will also depress wages through, for example, the threat to withdraw welfare benefits from those who refuse to be available to employers. As a result more people are pushed into the marketplace (Grover and Stewart, 1999: 76) . At both a structural and strategic level, therefore, neoliberalism through workfare aspires to compress wages in order procure greater amounts of surplus value from labour (McNally, 2009: 60) .
Socially and politically, neoliberalism has been promoted by strong law and order programmes, the articulation of an 'entrepreneurial' discourse through the virtues of, for example, 'risk taking', 'independence' and 'self-reliance', and by restricting trade union power (see Gamble, 1988; Gough, 2000; Keat, 1991) . The workfare state subsequently conceives itself as an 'enabling state' by supporting welfare services through its 'hollowed out' neoliberal form, including a commitment to the creation and extension of public-private partnerships (PPPs) across a range of social policies. PPPs are intended to deliver public services and capital projects through contracts with the state (Flinders, 2005: 218) and include formal and informal networks of information, communication and cooperation between local authorities, community groups, voluntary organizations (global as well as local). PPPs are often used strategically to legitimize the move towards a more 'humane', 'informal' and 'socialized' version of neoliberalism in civil society. Governments claim, for instance, that partnership networks are justified because they address and target local and social needs more precisely.
PPPs enable governments to redefine the welfare rights of a population so that welfare recipients are viewed as belonging to a homogeneous group (e.g. 'customers' of welfare) as opposed to belonging to distinctive social classes with specific social needs (Whitfield, 2001 ; see also Jordan, 1998). Welfare recipients, as 'partners' in wider public and private networks, have to agree to 'rights' and 'responsibilities' of their 'conditioned' welfare provisions based on the duty of individuals to ensure they remain employable. In the UK, for example, this has meant that New Labour was bent on 'the promotion of a particular type of moral community in which citizens earn access to their social rights through a combination of hard work, responsible behaviour and personal contribution' (Dwyer, 2002: 274; see also Fudge and Williams, 2006) . But while such moral dialogue is used to strengthen community ties and to tackle social exclusion, in practice it often serves to create simple binary dualisms in deprived communities based on the 'responsible' majority of residents and the 'irresponsible' minority who are portrayed as reproducing 'indecent', 'immoral', 'asocial' and 'work-shy' behavioural traits and who therefore need to be disciplined (Wallace, 2007) . In many instances the result of workfarism in the UK has been to increase poverty in distinct regions as specific types of welfare assistance are recomposed along workfare lines or simply withdrawn (Gough et al., 2006) . One study estimates the number of people living in poverty (defined as having an income of 60 percent or less of the median) rose in the UK from 7 million in 1979 to 13 million in 2005/6. A similar trend is evident in the US (Glasmeier et al., 2008: 3) .
Private business is interested in PPPs when profits can be made, and will frequently prefer public services where they believe that profits will be highest. This forces governments to ensure that any prospective PPP scheme will bring meaningful rewards for the private sector (Funnell et al., 2009: 23) . Neoliberalism is not therefore only associated with something called the 'free market'. Marketization of public services through PPPs is often a long, drawn out process that can involve: the slow erosion of an ethos of publicness in favour of business interests; the competitive subcontracting out of different services and/or facilities within a branch of particular public services; the transfer to quangos of the governance of public services; the establishment of private finance initiatives in order to attract private business into the public sector; the growth of secondary financial markets to fund private finance initiatives and to sell, for example, shares in them; commodification and flexibility of labour within public services; and endeavours to weaken the power of national trade unions within public services (Whitfield, 2006: 25-6) .
The workfare agenda and partnership networks hint at how a more 'humane' neoliberal governance regime has also been implemented at an international level, including the emergence in the 1990s of a new humanitarian agenda. During the 1980s, the Reagan administration funded covert and mainly right-wing militias to destabilize states seen to be supporters of the Soviet Union. Reagan and his advisors carried out 'low intensity warfare', in the ideological name of freeing the world from an ailing Soviet threat. But Reagan never really pursued a coherent 'human rights' or 'humanitarian' agenda; at least not in international policy rhetoric. In fact, Reagan's administration went out of its way to placate inhumane, authoritarian and dictatorial governments around the world, which included South Africa under the white apartheid system, the military rulers of Argentina in the early 1980s, the military president in the guise of General Chun Doo Hwan of South Korea, Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines and President Jean-Claude Duvalier of Haiti (see McMahan, 1985; Molloy, 2001) .
This policy standpoint changed in the 1990s when 'humanitarian intervention' increased. Some western governments, particularly the US and UK, publicly announced a new 'ethical' standpoint in international relations in favour of human rights enforcement in authoritarian regimes (see Chandler, 2002) . This more 'compassionate' agenda on the part of some western states was ideologically supported by a more 'humane' policy agenda in global institutions such as the World Bank. Powerful external global state and government institutions began to define a new moral agenda for 'problem' areas in the world and, as a result, identify which countries should be included in recognized political procedures (Marriage, 2006) . In the next section it is argued that ethical humanitarianism mirrors the neoliberal workfare state agenda in various ways. It represents a more caring and humane type of neolioberal capitalism, but has also exacerbated specific social problems in the world.
Informal Global Capitalism and Humanitarian Governance
The 'Washington Consensus' of the early 1990s gave way by the late 1990s to the 'post-Washington Consensus' and the new humanitarianism of 'soft neoliberalism' (see Fine, 2001 ), including the World Bank's initiation of a three-part study of poverty titled Voices of the Poor for the World Development Report 2000/2001. This study sought to highlight regional patterns of global poverty while providing the world's poor with a platform through which they could speak about their plight in their own words (see, for example, Narayan et al., 2000) . Uniquely, this study was built on interviews with the poor around the world and sought to understand the everyday feelings and relationships of what it means to be poor. This heralded, as Pupavac (2005) rightly notes, a more psychological and intangible way of studying poverty; one that highlighted the importance of 'tacit knowledge' in the shape of individual stories, narratives and feelings about what it means to live in hardship and deprivation in order to build a definition of poverty based on first-hand accounts. Community activism is perceived to be one of the best routes to extend democratic capacities and responsibilities around the world in this respect (cf. Ayers, 2006) . As Pupavac notes, if a number of individuals say that they get 'depressed' by the daily grind of being unemployed then 'depression' is seen by the World Bank as an indicator that obstructs people gaining employment to a greater extent than global structural conditions associated with uneven development and exploitation (Pupavac, 2005: 174) . From this perspective, one way out of poverty in the developing world is to 'empower' people in their communities by strengthening civil society, the public sphere, social capital and the capabilities of those in poverty. The informal ingredients of humanitarian aid are manifest in such an approach, especially since the tacit and social knowledge of those in poverty is embraced as a remedy to social ills, as are the community and social networks within which the poor move in and out. Such an approach is also characterized as mobilizing a community's specific capabilities to combat poverty.
As we can see, 'empowerment' programmes in combating global poverty are similar to the wider neoliberal workfare agenda. This is clear in the way in which many humanitarian agencies such as Oxfam are these days keen to promote the ideals of community empowerment for the poor of the world. Underpinning these campaigns is a belief that poverty is caused to a large extent by the poor being 'powerless' to control poverty rather than poverty being caused by underlying structural problems in the global neoliberal economy ; see also below).
Humanitarian organizations have been transformed into 'global partners' by establishing PPPs between themselves and other organizations that include local, translocal and global governments, businesses and voluntary agencies. Problematically, the formation of PPPs in this instance ensures that humanitarian relief is given according to variety of marketrelated goals and outcomes. A key requirement is that more countries participate in open, free market global trade, a point conceded by the UN Commission on Global Governance (1998; see also Soederberg, 2006) . Public dialogue on world poverty consequently displays different and often contradictory themes. On the one hand, global governance organizations such as the World Bank accept some arguments that suggest global poverty is a consequence of unfair global trade agreements. On the other hand, there is a push for developing countries to end 'corrupt' political practices within their own borders and establish neoliberal free market policies of enterprise and innovation in order to tackle 'inefficient' public services, install efficient, competitive market-based systems, establish low supply costs and set up transparent tax laws (Cammack, 2006: 341-45) .
The 'soft power' of moral coercion associated with humanitarian intervention (Thornton, 2000 ; see also the next section) is frequently embedded in crude stereotypes of warring 'factionalised, tribalised, winner-takes-all politics' in developing countries (Brown, 2006: 368) , and reproduces problems and inequalities associated with workfarism. To its credit a recent World Bank Global Monitoring Report admits to some of these failures (World Bank, 2007: 14) . It indicates that aid from member states in the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (a body designed to discuss development and poverty reduction) fell by about 5 percent in 2006 to just below US$104 billion (World Bank, 2007: 15) . This figure is put into perspective when one considers that in 2003 alone military spending by the US stood at US$642 billion (Bond, 2006: 344) . But the Report also observes that the proliferation of new aid sources such as donors, private foundations and global funds, in other words those PPPs acting as one key ingredient to the new neoliberal agenda, have often served to reduce the overall effectiveness of poverty relief even while increasing the total funds available. For example, the use of PPPs to fight global poverty often exacerbates the fragmentation of donor aid, creates problems of coordinating different funds, channels money to a smaller number of funded activities and increases the costs of sorting out this fragmented process. Developing countries constrained by a 'lower institutional capacity' subsequently have fewer resources to position themselves in an advantageous place in this global fragmented marketplace for aid and assistance (World Bank, 2007: 17) .
Moreover, even if aid increases, new bureaucratic mechanisms often mean that money will not reach its intended objectives and targets. One study in 2004 reported that only a maximum of 50 percent of apportioned aid flowed to its proposed destination while the rest went to pay for 'technical assistance (26 percent), aid administration (8 percent), emergency assistance (6 percent), debt relief paid to other creditor agencies (4 percent) and other spending (6 percent)' (Loots, 2006: 367) . The failure of other high-profile global public events, such as the Live8 concerts in 2005 aiming to raise awareness of poverty in Africa and to apply pressure on G8 governments to increase aid, prompted the former UN secretary-general Kofi Annan to announce in 2007 that the promise by G8 leaders to expand aid to US$50 billion by 2010 had hit only 10 percent of its target (The Guardian, 2007) . Indeed, absolute poverty has increased in three areas of the world over the last few decades. Africa saw an increase of 150 million people living on less than US$1 per day from 1981 to 2001. In Latin America, the number of poor increased by 14 million over the same period by World Bank standards, while other standards put the figure at 85 million. In the former Soviet countries and in Central Asia, poverty increased from 1 million to 18 million by World Bank standards (Therborn, 2006: 20-6) .
These difficulties are compounded by the ways in which debates on global poverty and inequality are structured through the new neoliberal humanitarian agenda. For example, little is said in public debates about how developing countries have been forced by the IMF to accumulate international reserves of dollars to stabilize exchange rates and to fend off any unexpected about-turns in capital flows. In reality, as Lapavitsas observes, accumulating reserves in this way has helped to deepen economic imperialism primarily because central banks in developing countries have bought US state-securities and have thus effectively supplied capital to the US (Lapavitsas, 2009: 120) . 'Development' has subsequently become entangled in private finance and the vagaries of the global marketplace (Bracking, 2009: 145 ; see also below). Also, the new humanitarianism depoliticizes global community activism by defining 'helping out' in a community as an individual act and an individual choice. Subsequently, the compensation of doing international voluntary work is presented as one way to gain an intangible sense of 'individual reward' for adopting a 'responsibility to others' in providing welfare provisions that was once the remit of the nation-state (Lacey and Ilcan, 2006: 39) . In addition, global institutions rarely acknowledge that international agencies often lack accountability to the populations they serve (McCormack, 2008) or that elites in developing countries move their wealth in the form of assets outside their home countries in the form of 'resource outflows such as capital flight, tax avoidance and tax evasion' (Taylor, 2006: 372) .
There is, moreover, the problem of how global institutions statistically measure global poverty. Under the neoliberal project rational choice models are frequently applied in which estimations are made based on idealtype calculating individuals operating in ideal-type markets. When measuring global poverty, however, these approaches bracket out real social and historical mechanisms (Cramer, 2002; Korf, 2006; Sutcliffe, 2004) . Many studies on global poverty also use narrow indicators such as the World Bank's 'purchasing power parity' dollar, which compares the purchasing power of commodities consumed across social classes and across countries and which therefore obliterates complex differences in lifestyles, structural resources and life chances between social classes (Kiely, 2005: 139) . In all of these instances a neoliberal free market agenda is tacitly articulated that supports 'individual rationality' congruent with business interests over the rights of social classes and their social needs (Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris, 2008: 223) . These problems have been exacerbated during the financial meltdown of recent times. In the commodity futures markets during 2007, commodity prices, most notably agro-commodity futures, increased because of speculative practices, and when financial speculators withdrew from this market in mid-2008 commodity prices took a nose dive, with harsh consequences for the developing world (Bello and Baviera, 2009) In the next section, I argue that, contrary to Hardt and Negri's analysis, a neoliberal humanitarian agenda is perfectly compatible with an imperialist agenda dominated by powerful states and led by the US administration.
Imperial, or Imperialist, Humanitarianism?
There has been an explosion since the 1980s of NGOs actively working in areas of humanitarian aid, development and relief in the developing world. According to Reimann (2006) , this is due, among other things, to the number of national and global institutions willing to fund the humanitarian work of various NGOs. These institutions include the UN, the EU, bilateral aid agencies sponsored by western states (e.g. the US Agency for International Development), global quango bodies (e.g. the African Development Foundation) and private foundations (e.g. the Ford Foundation in the US) (Reimann, 2006: 48-55) .
At first sight, Hardt and Negri's argument that no one dominant state controls this new 'imperial' humanitarian agenda seems plausible. However, caution is needed. We have already seen that the financial neoliberal global environment is mediated through and held together by the US state. The global financial architecture not only benefits the US but also provides advantages to other dominant states and economies. For example, it provides opportunities for dominant states to export and transfer their own neoliberal industries and neoliberal social policies to other countries in the search for profits. The analysis provided by Holden (2009) of how the British state has initiated a healthcare industrial strategy to export health services based on PPPs to various countries is instructive here. The UK's National Health Service (NHS) garners goods and services from numerous firms and is therefore in a good position to produce and maintain enormous demand for these supplies (Holden, 2009: 317) . In 2003 the British government with help from industry set up the Health Industry Task Force (HITF) to explore avenues and opportunities for the NHS to enter and influence the global healthcare marketplace. To this extent, the HITF has identified a number of 'partners' in the form of stakeholders (e.g. UK government-led Trade and Investment), aid agencies (e.g. the UK Department for International Development), quangos and global governance organizations (e.g. the UN) who can help to promote this global economic health strategy. The HITF has also set out 'action plans for priority markets, which are to follow from a number of scoping missions to identify opportunities in particular markets' (Holden, 2009: 320) . 'Priority markets' include China, India, Brazil, Israel, Malaysia, Singapore and South Africa, while markets that are identified as 'key opportunities' include Chile, Poland, Romania and Greece. To date, British consultants and officials have visited many of these countries to gain a foothold in their respective healthcare markets.
But the US has been the leading figure in the new humanitarian standpoint. Between 1995 and 1997, the US gave 20 percent of total humanitarian assistance while three years later this had risen to 30 percent. The second major contributor during this period was the European Community Humanitarian Organization (Barnett, 2005: 727) . The US, as the major donor in humanitarian aid, has considerable leverage in defining the humanitarian agenda for the international community for its own political interests (see below). The politicized nature of the new humanitarian ethos is also conspicuous in the area of philanthropy. Between 1962 and 2002, gift giving to help global social causes from the likes of charitable foundations, individuals and corporations in America increased from US$70 billion to US$241 billion (Vogel, 2006: 640) . Acutely aware of the influence philanthropy enjoys around the world, the US government has enacted policies like tax incentives to encourage philanthropic aid to flow through US-based intermediaries such as NGOs. Some NGOs, attentive of a need to respond to anti-American feelings around the world, have programmes attached to their funding requirements which aim to teach the values of American citizenship to other cultures, while other non-profit organizations teach the values of neoliberal ideals in the areas of 'social entrepreneurship' education and 'financial education' (Vogel, 2006: 646) .
For the administration of George W. Bush Jr, humanitarianism was a particularly useful policy to follow because it chimed well with the moralism underpinning the then government's broader neoconservative standpoint. Homolar-Riechmann (2009) claims that while their neoconservative forebears in the 1960s and 1970s tended to rally against a 'permissive' and 'secular society' at home by invoking 'compassionate humanist' moral virtues and domestic social policies based on 'good character', contemporary neoconservatives have added the need to maintain a strong foreign policy and intervene in selective countries to protect US interests and foster a 'global common good' against perceived 'greater evils' in the world (HomolarRiechmann, 2009: 182-3) . Thus, while the Clinton administration advanced neoliberal policies but also held onto the idea that 'American society was not generally perceived as being in crisis' (Steinmetz, 2003: 336) , Bush, in line with general neoconservative principles, believed that domestic and international order could be fostered through the imposition of what amounted to an American security state (see Drolet, 2007: 263) . Financial neoliberalism was still pursued, but this was now linked with more targeted protectionist policies for certain national industries, increased state expenditure for military industries, unilateral intervention based on a moral belief in defeating 'greater evils' in the world, and selectively targeted humanitarian intervention to promote a moral international order in which 'experts' under the sway of the US administration claimed to be acting on behalf of local populations (Cottey, 2008: 431; Glassman, 2005 Glassman, : 1530 Homolar-Riechmann, 2009: 181; see also Callinicos, 2003; Thornton, 2004) .
Bush pushed forward his neoconservative security agenda through both domestic and international policies. Domestically, he increased the unilateral power of presidential authority. According to Waterman (2009: 6-7) , significant in this respect was the veto Bush created which allowed him to remove from public scrutiny those selective provisions of a signed legislative bill with which he disagreed. Such unilateral power enabled Bush and his advisors to divert money to fund secret prisons for terrorist suspects in different parts of the world before Congress was informed about these actions. Internationally, for example, the Bush government pursued a 'virtual peace' by opening up new routes for neoliberal governance through military engagements. This also gave the US some leverage to serve the interests of other core capitalist states. As Stokes (2007: 251) notes, US intervention in the Middle East has meant that Japan, Europe and China receive large amounts of the oil produced from the region. So while the neoconservative governments of Bush did propel the American state towards a more unilateral position in the realm of particular global policies such as security (see Rapkin, 2005) , this was coupled with policies that promoted some of the economic interests of other core states (although see also the Conclusion).
Moral and security concerns were sustained by reports issued by various global governance organizations. For example, the Commission of Human Security's Human Security Now (2003) report argued that global security should be increased by ensuring that essential freedoms are in place for people around the world. A global strategy should integrate, coordinate and centralize different regulatory, voluntary and private companies so as to produce an international framework that will protect people from global threats, including the threat of poverty. Thus the global social policy domain in the form of PPPs, and including issues ranging from the environment, education and healthcare provision, is seen as an integral arena in developing and maintaining this new security ethos (Duffield and Waddell, 2006: 8-9 ; see also Duffield, 2002) .
More generally, these and other policies went on to justify, promote and politicize strategically selective humanitarian intervention across the globe (Fassin, 2007: 509) . This has been especially the case with respect to the increase in the level of bilateral, as opposed to multilateral, aid. Bilateral aid is given on the principle that the aid donor can dictate to humanitarian agencies how relief funds can be earmarked for specific humanitarian purposes. For instance, almost half of relief funds given to the UN's call to support 25 appeals in 2002 were earmarked for Afghanistan even though other countries like Sudan, Congo, northern Uganda and Angola were in desperate, if not greater, need (Barnett, 2005: 731) . Illustrations such as this may lend some support to the claim that the politicization of humanitarian aid increases levels of disparity between developing countries and also inefficiently allocates emergency funds (Belloni, 2007: 466) . Ironically, however, it is exactly the politicized nature of humanitarianism which has encouraged many NGOs to extend their bureaucratic procedures to embedded local social movements in the developing world and as a result help to neuter the radical and political potential of those movements (Davis, 2006: 76) .
These arguments are not intended to imply a blanket rejection of all forms of social movement activism. Without doubt, some NGOs have furthered the cause of specific policy campaigns in favour of the poor and disadvantaged. Such campaigns are complex and multifaceted and operate at different levels in different social spaces. For instance, some Brazilian NGOs have built links with political parties in Brazil and this has furthered their campaigning work for marginal communities in the country (Mitlin et al., 2007) . At the same time, however, much of the overall humanitarian NGO agenda has contributed to the depoliticization of global civil society in respect of tackling those social structures that help to perpetuate global exploitation and oppression (see Jaeger, 2007) . Take human rights NGOs as an illustration. Some global governance organizations such as the World Bank, UN and EU have accepted in principle the idea 'of core labour rights as appropriate international legal aspirations in the face of economic globalization' (Macklem, 2005: 83) . Yet many human rights NGOs focus their energies on political and civil rights abuses in developing countries and use strategies such as litigations against particular state authorities to this effect. Through their case study of Israeli rights NGOs, Berkovitch and Gordon (2008: 894) argue, however, that litigation strategies, based as they are on a legalistic approach to human rights, are founded on the idea that the law is an impartial system of adjudication. Litigation thus tends not to pose a threat to prevailing social structures mediated through factors such as power and inequality. This is in contrast to campaigns for economic and social rights which frequently challenge fundamental structures of exploitation, injustice and inequality. But human rights NGOs that engage in this latter type of (radical) activism face the threat of a reduction in donations from wealthy countries like the US, unlike those NGOs that restrict themselves to championing political and civil rights (Berkovitch and Gordon, 2008: 890-1) . The main point is that the overall hegemony of the 'neoliberal humanitarian' agenda by the US and its allies significantly constrains the work of political and radical activists (Mitlin et al., 2007) .
The 'war on terror' has been a convenient discursive lynchpin for public military and humanitarian endeavours based on a questionable and simplistic rhetoric of a 'new' global terrorist threat associated with factors such as weapons of mass destruction and religious extremism (see Field, 2009 ).The invasion of Iraq has shown the nebulous basis of neoconservative morality and humanitarianism by highlighting the connection between neoliberal governance networks of Empire and imperialist military conquests. Maintenance of law in Iraq was handed over to the private corporation DynCorp, for example, with a contract worth US$50 million (Pieterse, 2004: 49) . In addition, the establishment of the Trade Bank of Iraq (TBI), managed by JP Morgan bank, was empowered to grant export guarantees for foreign companies and governments so that they will trade with Iraq. TBI therefore effectively pays for the provisions of foreign companies and governments in Iraq, and this payment is itself guaranteed by future revenues from Iraqi oil supplies. Oil, as a large economic national asset for Iraq, is thereby placed in an uncertain context as private businesses have invested in its speculative potential (Hartnett and Stengrim, 2006: 257-8) .
1 'Crony capitalism' (Hartnett and Stengrim, 2006: 244) , based on corporate and political corruption and the 'exploitation of a periphery by a core' (Saull, 2008: 312) , has been governed through a neoliberal economic project from the outset. After the Iraq invasion the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), under the authority of an Anglo-American alliance, was established to govern Iraqi society. Maintaining its rule for 14 months, the CPA issued a number of orders that forced neoliberal policies (e.g. the abolition of import tariffs and trade barriers, the deregulation of the labour market and wage protection, reforms to the monetary system and banking sector) onto Iraqi society (Whyte, 2007: 181) . The neoliberal programme even included the privatization of security on the streets of Iraq, which has led to the growing unaccountability of private contracted security forces in the region (Welch, 2009 ). These problems of legitimacy are not helped by the continued support given by the US administration to the political ambitions and sectarianism of former exiles such as Ahmed Chalabi in the newly designed Iraqi democracy. Many of these exiles lack a support base in Iraqi society and fail to engage the electorate democratically in vigorous debate over important issues, preferring instead back-room deals with each other and with their political opponents (Dodge, 2009) . To conclude this section, then, we can say that 'humanitarianism' has become an attempt to convince a sceptical global public that some western states in collaboration with a host of 'partners' (e.g. NGOs), and led by the US government, can legitimately intervene in places of internal conflict. But without the requisite real empowerment of local populations these conflict zones soon give way to 'elite corruption, grey markets, and of course, poverty' (Richmond, 2006: 310) . This mix of human rights promotion through armed intervention has variously been dubbed 'humanitarian imperialism' (Bricmont, 2006) , 'military humanism' (Chomsky, 1999) , 'soft imperialism' (Davis, 2006) and 'violent humanitarianism' (Slim, 2001) . Terms such as these highlight the contradiction between the 'soft' practices of humanitarianism by western allies and partners in 'failed states' and the frankly blatant violation of human rights by the very same western allies in many of those states. In this respect imperialist politics are now supplemented with the more informal 'soft power' of moral coercion, dubbed by some as 'Empire', through policies such as humanitarianism, social capital, empowerment, partnerships and so on (see Thornton, 2000) .
Conclusion
Social programmes such as ethical humanitarianism are often, as Chandler (2007) suggests, vague and hazy. However, this does not represent a weakness of political elites but, rather, is part of the ideological, political and social project of neoliberalism. It is wrong to dismiss such programmes on the grounds that they serve no coherent political purpose. On the contrary, this article suggests that projects such as ethical humanitarianism can be conceived as being part of a neoliberal workfare state project mediated by the US state. Moreover, this state project has extended the processes and practices of financialization across the world and may well serve to do so in the foreseeable future, albeit in a modified form. This does not deny that these interlinked processes are also embedded in structural and strategic contradictions, dilemmas and modes of resistance (see Brand and Görg, 2008; Roberts, 2009) . But contemporary capitalism is constituted by informal governance mechanisms, which some call 'Empire', and by imperialist domination.
The article has sought to understand how the capitalist state operates through distinct state projects (e.g. workfarism) and governance mechanisms in order to pursue economic projects such as financialization. This last aspect is missing in analyses such as Chandler's since these explorations of capitalism rarely engage in theorizing about the capitalist state. They rarely tell us why the state is a capitalist state and why the capitalist state adopts specific political projects during distinct historical moments in time. When state theory is spoken about, as in the case of Hardt and Negri, this is often accomplished through ideal-types intended to illustrate the 'newness' of Empire. Hardt and Negri are wrong to assume that no single global power mediates 'soft policies' such as humanitarian intervention. Indeed, from the evidence presented it is plausible to argue that while imperialism has of late transformed itself into an imperial regime in Hardt and Negri's sense of that term, this is just one element of a wider imperialist project.
Even though the article has not been concerned to illustrate how domestic and local US politics impact on wider imperialist networks of Empire building, there is nothing in this Marxist perspective that would rule out such an investigation, contrary to what O'Meara (2006: 23) argues. In fact, despite the observations made here on American unilateralism, a degree of inter-imperialist rivalry between nation-states will also be apparent. Indeed, a Marxist dialectical theory of the state of the sort outlined in this article alerts us to the competitive nature of state mechanisms and their hegemonic and organizational capability to attract global (financial) capital. These mechanisms and organizational capabilities are both internally related to regulatory procedures which states have over their own domestic populations and domestic policies within defined territorial borders (e.g. introducing workfare policies at home) and externally related to competitive tendencies between nationstates (e.g. competition between states in exporting their respective healthcare industries to other countries; see also Dalby, 2008) .
Nation-states align themselves to other nation-states to the extent that they perceive it profitable to do so. Shifting their allegiances elsewhere or engaging in protectionist policies are just two of many other competitive options open to nation-states in this respect. For example, the fact that the US must import huge sums of money from external states to service the deficit in their balance of payments creates further tensions with other states especially if creditors start to believe that the US dollar's worth is in terminal decline (Albo, 2003: 101) . It is not inevitable, in other words, that the dollar will always play a regulatory role for global financialization (see Nordhaug, 2005) . Contrary to what Callinicos (2009: 16-17) suggests, the focus on American hegemony does not necessarily lead one to conclude that competitive rivalries between different states are now obsolete. In fact, the neoliberal drive to accumulate financial capital has moved states to become more globally competitive.
Perhaps it is too early to tell exactly how the new American administration under Barack Obama will differ in the implementation of financialization through a 'humane' neoliberalism. While there is cause for some celebration at Obama's victory, we must also remain critically cautious as regards America's current foreign policy. As Homolar-Riechmann (2009) suggests, new Democratic Party think-tanks on American foreign policy such as the Truman National Security Project have broadly adopted some neoconservative ideals, especially those which emphasize the promotion of 'human rights and economic well-being' through a 'sensible use of US military force' against regimes perceived to be authoritarian and corrupt (Homolar-Riechmann, 2009: 189) . During his presidential campaign, Obama invoked variants of these ideals in a number of his speeches to the American people (for a good analysis of Obama's presidential speeches, see Toal, 2009 ). Certainly, it might very well prove to be the case that Obama's government will indeed gradually 'lobby for a more cooperative, harmonious world order' (Quinn, 2007: 540) . Yet history shows us that neoliberalism is an extremely flexible state strategy for governments to pursue. If Obama does therefore pursue a new 'harmonious world order', there is no reason to believe that this would be incompatible with the pursuit of yet another 'soft' and 'humane' version of neoliberalism. Note 1. In one respect, the US government was only deepening those dubious relationships between corrupt regimes and itself which had been established prior to 9/11. One illustration was Obiang Nguema's repressive Equatorial Guinea regime to which the US government in 2000 gave funds in order to secure lucrative oil deals for American-owned companies in the region (Leech, 2006: 116-18 ). After 9/11, however, such acts became part of a new moralism of a war on terror.
